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FISCHER AND AVOIDABILITY: 
A REPLY TO WIDERKER AND KATZ OFF 
Daniel James Speak 
In a recent exchange, John M. Fischer and David Widerker have debated 
whether or not it is appropriate to employ Frankfurt-style examples in efforts 
to challenge the intuitively plausible "principle of alternative possibilities." 
Most recently, David Widerker and Charlotte Katzoff have tried to defend 
Widerker's initial claim that such examples beg the question against libertari-
anism. As a libertarian sympathizer, I would like very much for these argu-
ments to go through. However, I argue here that (1) their "molinist" critique is 
off-target, (2) their demonstration of the general falsity of Fischer's libertarian-
ism misses the point, and (3) they infer the relevance of alternative possibilities 
from the mere existence of such alternatives in a way that requires unprovided 
justification. 
The pages of this journal have recently been the setting for what I take to 
be an important debate for those concerned with the relationship 
between freedom and moral responsibility. At issue in this debate, 
broadly, has been the appropriateness of employing Frankfurt-style 
counterexamples to the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP)l. In 
these examples, an agent is choosing between two alternative courses of 
action, A and B. However, the agent is unaware of the presence of an 
intervener with the ability and desire to guarantee that she (the agent) 
choose A. So, if the intervener recognizes an inclination in the agent to 
choose B, he uses his power to bring it about that she chooses A. Thus, it 
seems that the agent cannot avoid choosing A. Nevertheless, it looks as if 
the agent can be held morally responsible for choosing A, provided she 
does so without intervention. In other words, she can be responsible for 
choosing A even though she could not do otherwise. David Widerker 
has argued that the structure of such examples presupposes the falsity of 
libertarianism.2 That is, he suggests that the examples "work" only if 
some form of causal determinism obtains in the sequence.' If this is 
right, it is an important critique, since Frankfurt-style examples are sup-
posed to be cases in which an individual intuitively is morally responsi-
ble. Compatiblistic arguments which employ such examples would, 
then, be unacceptably question-begging. 
In response, John Martin Fischer has tried to show that the conditions 
for Frankfurt-style examples do not necessarily violate the intuitions of 
libertarians.4 For, he argues, there are plausible versions of libertarianism 
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that can account for the in-principle predictable relationship in an agent 
between prior signs and subsequent actions required by the examples. 
More specifically, Fischer has pointed out that: (1) employing Widerker's 
reasoning involves rejecting without argument the view (associated with 
Molina, among others) that subjunctive conditionals pertaining to free 
actions could be rendered true by non-causal facts, and (2) forms of liber-
tarianism can be constructed that side-step Widerker's attack. In particu-
lar, Fischer presents a version of libertarianism in which there is indeter-
minacy in the agent's deliberations, but not in the transition from the 
agent's best judgment to action. This plausible version of libertarianism, 
he claims, is compatible with Frankfurt-style counterexamples. 
In the latest salvo, David Widerker and Charlotte Katzoff defend the 
original claim that the counterfactual intervention required by Frankfurt-
style examples assumes conditions that the libertarian finds problematic.' 
They argue, first, that Fischer's suggestion about the relevant subjunctive 
conditionals undermines the coherence of Molinism. Also, they insist 
that the version of libertarianism Fischer develops is demonstrably false. 
Finally, they suggest that even if Fischer's libertarianism is granted, alter-
native possibilities are still necessary for moral responsibility. 
This is obviously a rough sketch of their arguments and fuller devel-
opment will be necessary shortly. However, I should say at this point 
that my own intuitions are incompatiblistic. This would, of course, 
make Widerker and Katzoff natural allies. Nevertheless, I feel com-
pelled to respond to them (grudgingly) on Fischer's behalf. The con-
tentions of Widerker and Katzoff in "Avoidability and Libertarianism" 
seem to me to be largely on the wrong track. I begin by arguing that 
their first two responses leave Fischer's thesis untouched. That is, I try 
to show that nothing in Fischer's argument hangs either on the coher-
ence of Molinism or the universal applicability of the form of libertarian-
ism he sketches as an example. But their third point -regarding the 
presence of alternatives even in this libertarian case- has promise. 
However, their account of the possible alternatives is confusing and 
ambiguous. After attempting to remove this confusion by suggesting 
various interpretations of their account, I argue that their conclusion 
comes too quickly. For it does not follow (directly) from the fact that 
there are alternatives in these cases that such alternatives constitute a 
necessary condition for moral responsibility. In fact, it is precisely this 
inference that Fischer explicitly attempts to discredit in Chapter seven of 
The Metaphysics olFree Will. There he contends that the mere presence of 
alternatives (even in Frankfurt cases) only reveals that there is a "flicker 
of freedom." He goes on to defend the claim that such flickers are not 
robust enough to ground our attributions of moral responsibility.6 
While Widerker and Katzoff are aware of this "anti-flicker" strategy, 
they fail to take it seriously enough. 
I. The "Molinist" Problem 
Widerker and Katzoff begin their response by claiming that Fischer's 
account of (what they call) "Molinist necessity" renders Molinism inco-
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herent. That is, if Molina's view about the power of non-causal facts 
were as Fischer describes, then it would be incompatible with other fea-
tures of Molina's general theory. As I suggested above, this response 
seems off-target. 
Fischer's concern is with a particular libertarian view about agency -{)ne 
compatible with Frankfurt-style examples. On this view, an agent's actions 
can be accurately predicted if the predictor has access to crucial facts about 
the agent (say, facts about her character, values, etc.). Still, a libertarian of 
this sort will stop short of saying that the agent's action, though predictable, 
is causally determined. 
This is to say that, according to Fischer, conditionals like the follow-
ing could be true: 
(5) If Jones were to show an inclination at T to decide to vote for 
Reagan at T +i, then Jones would decide to vote for Reagan at T +i. 
Furthermore, the truth of such conditionals need not be determined by 
causal facts. Thus, it could also be true that 
(5b) If Jones were to show an inclination at T to decide to vote for 
Reagan at T +i, then Jones would freely decide to vote for Reagan at T +i. 
Fischer contends that it is possible for subjunctive conditionals of freedom 
like those above to be true. Widerker and Katzoff have merely assumed 
the falsity of this contention in their analysis of Frankfurt-style examples. 
Admittedly, Fischer attributes this view about subjunctive condition-
als of freedom to Molina. And perhaps he could have been a bit more 
cautious by resisting the urge to term this view "Molinism." However, 
Fischer is explicit about his intentions at this point. He says, '''Molinism' 
is just a convenient term for the specific view under consideration 
here."7 That is, Fischer uses "Molinism" simply to refer to the claim that 
there can be true subjunctive conditionals of freedom. According to 
Fischer, Widerker's claim that libertarianism is incompatible with 
Frankfurt examples assumes that a form of libertarianism in which non-
causal facts can produce a kind of necessity is false. 
Now I hope it is clear why the response of Widerker and Katzoff miss-
es the point. Their claim is that Fischer's interpretation of Molina makes 
Molinism (broadly construed) inconsistent. But this counter threatens 
the argument only if Fischer is seeking to offer an interpretation of part of 
Molina's views which could then be imbedded within an account of 
Molina's views as a whole. But this is not Fischer's intention. According 
to Fischer, Widerker's claim that libertarianism is incompatible with 
Frankfurt examples assumes that a form of libertarianism in which non-
causal facts can produce a kind of necessity is false. And this should not 
be merely assumed. 
II. The response to Dennett's libertarianism 
In" A Reply To Widerker" Fischer formulates another version of libertari-
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anism that he believes is compatible with Frankfurt-style examples. 
Following suggestions by Daniel Dennett, he proposes an account of action 
in which there is indeterminacy in the process leading to an agent's best 
judgment. However, there is causal determination from the agent's best 
judgment to the agent's action. In this sort of case, it is clear that one could 
construct a Frankfurt-style example. For the agent could manifest a sign of 
his best judgment that a potential intervener could read and respond to. 
To explain, we could suppose for example, that whatever processes of 
deliberation Jones employs in contemplating whom to vote for are not 
deterministic. That is, at no point during his deliberation could the out-
come of his voting be inerrantly predicted. Thus, Jones appears to be 
free in a relevant libertarian sense. However, we could also suppose 
that once Jones forms the best judgment -that (say) he ought to vote for 
Reagan- then it is inevitable that he vote for Reagan. Further, we can 
imagine that if Jones forms the best judgment that he ought to vote for 
Reagan, he also presents a certain sign of this judgment. Let us assume 
that he exhibits a distinctive neural pattern. In this case, an intervener 
(properly constituted) could recognize this pattern and respond accord-
ingly. This seems to be a case in which Frankfurt-style examples are 
compatible with libertarianism. 
Widerker and Katzoff, however, believe that this account of action is 
demonstrably false. For, they argue, if the above sort of libertarianism 
were an accurate description of action, then weakness of the will would 
be impossible. This is because weakness of the will is defined here as 
the failure of an agent to act on his best judgment. There can be no such 
failure if causal determinism obtains between best judgment and action. 
At this point, Widerker and Katzoff simply point out, by example, that 
people sometimes do act against their best judgment. An individual 
may very well know that he ought to go to the dentist rather than put it 
off. Nevertheless, he does not make the appointment. Thus, the 
Dennett/Fischer suggestion on behalf of the libertarian must be false. 
Now, this response would be appropriate if the universal scope of 
this version of libertarianism were necessary to establish Fischer's view. 
But this is not the case. Again, Fischer is intending to show that an 
action can be free in a libertarian sense and yet still be predictable in a 
way required by the Frankfurt examples. Thus, Fischer can admit that 
human action often displays akrasia without giving up his point. He 
does not need Dennett's libertarianism to be true in every case. He needs 
only one case in which there is indeterminacy in the agent's deliberation 
and yet there is determination from best judgment to action. If there is 
(or could be) just one such case, then a Frankfurt-style example can be 
constructed that will show that the agent in this case can be responsible 
for an action even though she could not have avoided it. And presum-
ably a libertarian will admit that at least some cases are (or could be) like 
this. That is, there is (or could be) at least one person who is so consti-
tuted that she cannot fail (in a particular circumstance) to act on her best 
judgment. This, it seems to me, is Fischer's point. If this is right, then 
the response of Widerker and Katzoff misses the mark again. For it 
makes no difference whether or not this version of libertarianism is uni-
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versally accurate. 
But perhaps Widerker and Katzoff are suggesting that the reality of 
incontinence, which they illustrate in a particular case, tells us some-
thing about human motivational structure in general. Perhaps they are 
arguing that weakness of the will is always possible for an agent in 
every circumstance.b If this were true, then I grant that Fischer's libertar-
ianism would be discredited. 
I do not believe, however, that Widerker and Katzoff have the argu-
mentative machinery in place necessary to reach this conclusion.9 Such 
machinery would have to justify the inference from the existence of 
incontinence on some occasions to the universal possibility of inconti-
nence for all human agents in every circumstance. How could this infer-
ence possibly be justified? Given the example they have constructed, 
and the accompanying argumentation, Widerker and Katzoff seem justi-
fied only in asserting that some actions of some agents are not ensured 
by (and thus are not "deterministically related to") the agent's best judg-
ment. To make the argument that seems to me necessary to invalidate 
Fischer's claim, they need to defend something like: (*) If the actions of 
some agents are not ensured by their best judgments, then the actions of 
no agents are ensured by their best judgment. This would be an intrigu-
ing claim, but I do not see any straightforward way of establishing it. 
Since Widerker and Katzoff have given us no reason to accept (*), I con-
clude that Fischer's thesis remains viable. 
Fischer merely presents a hypothetical possibility. He is not seeking 
to give an account of how all or most people actually are. Similarly, 
Harry Frankfurt was not assuming that his original examples captured 
some essential or common feature of human action. We can safely pre-
sume that situations in which there is a looming intervener are statisti-
cally rare. The paint is the possibility. And the same is true with 
Fischer's example. At issue is whether or not this particular libertarian 
description of action can apply to at least one case. Widerker and 
Katzoff seem to have provided no reason for doubting this. 
III. Ubiquitous Alternatives 
In their final argument, Widerker and Katzoff grant the plausibility of 
Fischer's hybrid libertarianism (merely for the sake of argument). Then 
they attempt to show that even if this form of libertarianism is right, 
there will still be room in Frankfurt examples for some alternative possi-
bilities. In particular, they claim that we would hold an agent account-
able under these circumstances (at least in part) because the agent could 
have formed an alternative best judgment. As they point out, Fischer 
rejects this idea, and proposes this example: 
... a baby has fallen into a swimming pool in front of you and is in 
immediate danger of drowning. All you have to do is bend over 
and pick the baby up; this would be extremely easy for you, and 
we may suppose that there are no other morally relevant reasons.lO 
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Suppose, now, that this is a Frankfurt case in which the intervener 
intends for you to save the baby. Thus, it is impossible for you to do 
otherwise than save the baby (since the intervener is able to read a sign 
of your best judgment and respond accordingly). Further, let us sup-
pose that you save the baby without intervention. Clearly you are 
responsible for your act. Now, Fischer admits that you could have 
formed an alternative best judgment. But he claims (a la Susan Wolf) 
that it is simply implausible to think that it is the existence of this very 
peculiar alternative that grounds your responsibility for the action. Why 
think that it is because you could have judged it best not to save the baby 
(when you had every reason to do so) that you are responsible, in the 
actual sequence, for saving the baby? Why think, as it were, that being 
able to judge irrationally should be relevant to such ascriptions? 
In response, Widerker and Katzoff wonder n .•. whether the sort of pos-
sibility Fischer imagines is coherent, whether a normal person could 
judge best something for which he sees no good reason."ll But this 
seems to be tantamount to granting Fischer his point. If this option is 
incoherent for a normal person, then it looks to be a case in which a nor-
mal person has no alternatives and yet is morally responsible. 
However, they suggest, in an apparent counter to the above reasoning, 
that we suppose n ..• the alternative possibility in question is that of form-
ing simply a different judgment" (their italics).'" This is confusing. It is 
unclear what the relationship is between a judgment and a best judg-
ment, and why an alternative best judgment might be incoherent but an 
alternative judgment is not. What sense can be made of the distinction 
between a different best judgment and merely a different judgment? 
Perhaps they are appealing to a type-token distinction. Perhaps, that 
is, they are imagining that it is incoherent for a normal person to form a 
different type of judgment in this circumstance, but such a person could 
nevertheless form a different token judgment. When you formed the best 
judgment at t1 to save the child at t3, for example, you could also have 
formed the best judgment at t2 to save the child at t3. Another possibili-
ty here is that, while you formed the token judgment that you should 
save the baby by pulling her out of the pool by her feet, you could have 
avoided this token judgment by forming the alternative token judgment 
that you should pull her out by her arms. 
The danger with this response is that it does not seem to avoid or 
address Fischer's initial challenge. Fischer's argument was that even if 
you could form an alternative best judgment in the drowning-baby case, 
the alternatives available to a normal person would be too thin to 
ground moral responsibility. If the alternatives that Widerker and 
Katzoff ultimately appeal to are mere token differences, then Fischer's 
argument (plausibly) goes through. Why think that it is because you 
had mere temporal or stylistic options of this limited sort that you are 
responsible for your action?13 This sort of alternative possibility would 
not seem to be sufficiently robust to ground responsibility ascriptions. 
There is a second way in which Widerker and Katzoff might attempt 
to make sense of their crucial distinction between different best judg-
ments and different judgments. They might claim that a best judgment 
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is an all-things-considered judgment, but there can be other judgments 
which are not all-things-considered. On this account, you could not 
have reached a different all-things-considered judgment, but not all 
actions result from such judgments. Many of our judgments are prema-
ture or not fully informed. Sometimes such judgments lead to action. 
And you could have acted, in the drowning-baby case, on a less-than-
all-things-considered judgment. 
This analysis still appears to fall prey to Fischer's plausibility argu-
ment against the relevance of these sorts of alternabves. Admittedly, 
Widerker and Katzoff can, on this reading, maintain their position that a 
best judgment not to save the baby is incoherent. However, they will 
have to grant that a normal person could come to a different judgment 
only by (say) ignoring relevant data or failing to pay attention to the 
details of the situation. Furthermore, they will be forced to insist that it 
is in virtue of such alternatives that you are responsible for saving the 
baby. You are responsible because you could have acted in an irrational 
(indeed, one might say "irresponsible") fashion. Fischer argues that this 
is odd, and it does seem paradoxical that moral responsibility should rest 
on the possibility of irrationality.14 
Finally, Widerker and Katzoff might be appealing to a distinction 
very different from the sort considered aboveY Notice that the two 
potential interpretations I have explored involve differences in (what I 
will call) the structure of the alternative judgments. Thus, on these inter-
pretations the difference between a best judgment and a merely different 
judgment is not a matter of content. Both judgments are still about what 
is best to do. But it might be that Widereker and Katzoff are appealing to 
a difference in the content of the alternative judgment. A best judgment 
is about what is best to do. A different judgment might be about what is 
expedient, convenient, cruel, or fun to do. 
In response, recall Fischer's flicker argument. We want to know if the 
alternatives available to you in the drowning baby case can reasonably 
be thought to provide a foundation for our ascription to you of responsi-
bility for saving the baby. Is it because you could have formed a judg-
ment with different content (as here defined) that you are responsible 
for your action? I contend that Fischer's negative answer to this ques-
tion remains plausible and defensible. 
Why? Because Fischer's would-be interlocutor seems to be on the 
horns of a dilemma. Your alternative judgment either can lead to acbon 
or it cannot. If it cannot, then it is not relevant to ascriptions of responsi-
bility. Who cares if you can form the judgment that it would be (say) 
more convenient not to save the baby if your judgment cannot issue in 
action? Intuitively, only alternative judgments that can lead to alterna-
tive actions can bear on the question of responsibility for a given action. 
On the other hand, if the judgment in question can lead to action, then 
the problem of irrationality reappears. No normal person can fail to 
save the baby. The example is constructed so that any such failure will 
be irrational. And failing to save the baby will be irrational regardless of 
the content of the judgment that leads to this action. In defense of 
Fischer, I simply re-emphasize his initial Wolfian claim that it is implau-
246 Faith and Philosophy 
sible to think that our attributions of responsibility rest on the possibility 
of this sort of irrationality. Thus, this interpretation of the notion of a 
merely different judgment in terms of difference in content is no more 
satisfying than the interpretations in terms of difference in structure. 
In general, Widerker and Katzoff seem to assume what is false: that 
the inference from the existence of alternatives to the relevance of alterna-
tives requires no argument.'" I think incompatiblists, such as Widerker 
and Katzoff, need to respond to Fischer's argument that the sort of alter-
natives Widerker and Katzoff have isolated are not relevant. It is not 
enough to find a flicker of freedom, as Widerker and Katzoff have done. 
It must also be shown that these flickers have the kind of robustness suf-
ficient to ground responsibility. Those of us who are tempted by incom-
patiblism must go on, as it were, to "fan" the flickers of freedom. 1? 
University of California, Riverside 
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